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and unsure of himself—but also lucky,
in that he made fewer mistakes than
Takagi and Hara. More importantly,
the Japanese needed to maintain their
momentum, and that required an
outright victory. Much of Japan’s strategic
failure was the fault of Admiral Isoroku
Yamamoto, the fleet commander, who
did not give his men in the field enough
carriers to overwhelm the Americans
at a time when it was still possible for
the Japanese to do so; instead, it was an
even fight. “It had been his best (and
would prove to be his last) chance to
achieve an easy strategic victory over the
Americans, and he simply overlooked
it. Simply stated, this was a battle the
Japanese could have and should have
won, but chose not to; the opportunity
would not come again” (p. 282).
The book is not unblemished. For
example, Stern seems overly fond of
military acronyms. However, most of
its faults lie with the publisher rather
than the author. At forty-five dollars,
Scratch One Flattop seems to be priced
too high. Moreover, the quality of
maps, photos, and diagrams leaves
something to be desired. Still, all told,
Stern offers an intriguing and valuable
read that will be of interest and use to
students of World War II at all levels.

and, given the complex nature of
this interdisciplinary science, a
challenge that can boggle the mind
(pun intended). Artificial Intelligence
and Global Security is a trim volume
of interrelated chapters, skillfully
edited by Dr. Yvonne Masakowski,
that provides a timely primer on the
moral, ethical, and policy implications
associated with AI. While ostensibly
a book about technology, this is not
a technological book. Rather, Masakowski and the contributing authors
serve up thought-provoking and
relevant discussions that will challenge
the reader’s notions about AI when
juxtaposed against theories of just
war doctrine, individual and societal
morality, and the ethical constraints
and opportunities within the context
of the global security environment.

Artificial Intelligence and Global Security: Future
Trends, Threats and Considerations, ed. Yvonne
R. Masakowski. Bingley, U.K.: Emerald Publishing, 2020. 187 pages. $99.99.

With her education and experience in
psychology and philosophy, and her
recent professorship in the College
of Leadership and Ethics at the Naval
War College, Masakowski is uniquely
suited as editor of this volume. She
has assembled a clowder of established
scholars who are predominantly
trained in ethics and philosophy and
has interspersed a brace of programmatic and technical experts. Together,
these chapter authors examine a broad
swath of philosophical and ethical
issues, including in individual chapters
on the ethical dilemmas of AI and privacy, AI and moral reasoning, and the
particular challenges of AI and space
warfare, as well as several discussions
of future considerations for AI from
both ethical and policy perspectives.

Grappling with the technological,
policy, planning, and ethical issues
attendant to the emergence of artificial
intelligence (AI) is a daunting task

Among the book’s most engaging
chapters, William Casebeer’s discusses
the building of an artificial conscience
and the prospects for a morally
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autonomous AI. Currently a senior
researcher in human-machine systems
in the private sector, Casebeer’s central
question is whether AI can be used to
develop systems capable of reasoning
through moral issues. He makes an
argument for why we need to build this
artificial conscience soon, given that
AI already is being used in multiple
domains, then goes on to present a
rough blueprint for how to build one.
He describes how a machine with
an ethically grounded and morally
driven conscience may be coming to a
battlefield near you soon—no longer
bearing the tincture of science fiction.
The fulcrum chapter of the book, authored by John Shook, Tibor Solymosi,
and James Giordano on the ethical
constraints and contexts of AI use in
national security and warfare, is likely
to be of keen interest to readers of the
Naval War College Review. This chapter
describes a continuum from “soft”
to “hard” AI based on structural and
functional complexity that is useful in
determining attribution of actions—an
especially critical consideration for
the use of AI in warfare. The authors
contend that with soft AI, the human
fingerprint is evident and attribution is
readily detected, but as AI moves along
the continuum toward harder systems
that are autonomous and capable
of developing intelligence beyond
initial programming, attribution will
become far more problematic. Here,
a HAL 9000–like machine developing
actions and outcomes not intended
by human programmers and resistant
to “exogenous attempts at constraint,
imposition, and control” is the elixir
of science fiction. The value of this
chapter is in understanding the
essential characteristics of AI across
the continuum and in determining
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the bespoke development, application,
and constraints of all forms of AI.
The penultimate chapter of the book,
by Gina Granados Palmer, an interdisciplinary scholar, harvests the detailed
work in the preceding chapters and
develops a comprehensive summary of
the book’s themes. Here Palmer provides a thoughtful assessment of AI’s
overall security landscape and develops
four key considerations relating to
(1) the evolution of near-Turing-test
ethics in the human-machine team; (2)
the creation of short-, intermediate-,
and long-term strategies for ethical AI
development and use; (3) the development of dual-use ethics in relation
to dual-use AI; and (4) the urgent
need for strong ethical foundations to
underpin AI technological advances.
The volume concludes with a forwardlooking epilogue by Dr. James Canton,
a well-known futurist, who highlights
the opportunities as well as the
dangers of AI in the global security
environment. This final chapter, like
the future of AI itself, is simultaneously
hopeful and frightening. As Canton
points out, “we cannot fully fathom”
the full potential—both bright and
dangerous—of an AI-infused future.
He underscores that security at both
the local and global levels cannot be
conceptualized without fully envisioning how AI will evolve—a prophetic
and prescriptive admonition.
Artificial Intelligence and Global
Security is not a compendium of
information on current AI technology and its essential tools; given the
rapidly changing nature of AI, the
usefulness of such a book would be
fleeting and ephemeral. Rather, here
readers will discover a transcendent
and informed exploration of the
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ethical, moral, individual, societal,
and policy issues surrounding AI. It is
the book’s discussion of the enduring
nature of these issues that will be of
value and greatest significance to
the national-security community.
THOMAS CULORA

Six Victories: North Africa, Malta, and the Mediterranean Convoy War, November 1941–March
1942, by Vincent P. O’Hara. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019. 322 pages. $34.95.

In his latest book, Vincent P. O’Hara
adds to his previous works on the
Mediterranean during World War
II by analyzing the period between
November 1941 and March 1942. He
considers six decisive actions that
changed the tide of the naval war in
the Middle Sea, three of which went
in favor of the British (the actions of
Force K, the battle of Cape Bon, and the
first battle of Sirte [Sidra]) and three
in favor of the Italians (Alexandria, the
loss of Force K, and second Sirte).
The author’s detailed narrative reminds
the reader that the Mediterranean
war was one of naval attrition around
the sea-lanes crossing the theater.
An essential question in Six Victories
is the influence of intelligence on
naval operations. According to O’Hara,
while ULTRA provided critical data on
many occasions, information often
was untimely and was offset by Italian
counterintelligence. O’Hara’s thesis is
not entirely new; Italy’s leading scholar
working on ULTRA, Alberto Santoni,
reached similar conclusions in his 1981
study Il vero traditore, which is not
among the author’s references. O’Hara
claims that the higher ratio of Axis
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attacks against British convoys demonstrates that ULTRA did not affect the
operations significantly. The argument
is captious, since possessing intelligence
does not mean necessarily that it is
possible for one to attack; that possibility
was reduced severely for Britain in the
latter three of the “six victories.” However, when the British had the means, as
during the operations of Force K, ULTRA
allowed them to maximize the effectiveness of their limited forces, which were
numerically inferior to the enemy’s
and had fewer bases available to them
in the central Mediterranean. Finally,
the British ratio of success for attacked
convoys was better than that of the Axis.
Six Victories also puts great emphasis
on the consequences of the three Italian
victories. The destruction of Force K
ended a nightmare period for the Italian
convoys, while Alexandria allowed the
Axis to achieve preeminence in the
central Mediterranean. The pinnacle
was the second Sirte battle, defined as an
Italian victory—correctly reversing the
judgment of some British naval historians. Also, according to O’Hara, the battle
proved that the Italian surface fleet was a
credible deterrent, discouraging further
British attempts to resupply Malta (p.
254). Yet while the author’s conclusion
that second Sirte was an Axis victory is
persuasive as far as the destruction of the
enemy convoy goes, it is not so with respect to its consequences. The action did
not discourage further British attempts
to resupply Malta; instead, it encouraged
the Royal Navy to think that light surface
forces were sufficient to meet the Italian
fleet, preparing the way for the disaster
of HARPOON-VIGOROUS in June 1942.
Here the major shortcoming of
the book becomes apparent: not
putting the Italian actions into the

3

